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Imagination and Experience
A Commentary on Jérôme Dokic & Margherita Arcangeli
Anne-Sophie Brüggen
Jérôme Dokic and Margherita Arcangeli develop a taxonomy of the mental states
classified  as  experience-like  imaginings  in  their  paper  “The  Heterogeneity  of
Experential Imagination”. Experience-like imaginings are thought to re-create ex-
periences. Therefore, the taxonomy of the Experiential Imagination suggested by
the authors mirrors a taxonomy of the underlying, re-created experiences. In this
commentary, I will focus on the notion of re-creation that is invoked, and argue
that this notion must either be fleshed out further or omitted from the taxonomy.
Two further points follow this discussion: first I will discuss the idea of different
kinds of self-involvement in objective and subjective imagination and suggest an
alternative view. Then I raise some doubts about the classification of cognitive
imaginings as experiential imaginings. To summarise, I will suggest an alternative
interpretation of these findings by claiming that we can obtain a useful taxonomy
of imaginative states based on our pre-theoretical opinions. Furthermore, I will
explore the idea that experiential imaginings involve an empty point of view.
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In their paper “The Heterogeneity of Experien-
tial Imagination”, Jérôme Dokic and Margherita
Arcangeli offer a taxonomy of the various men-
tal  states  subsumed by them under  the  label
Experiential Imagination. Experiential Imagina-
tion is introduced as the re-creation of non-ima-
ginative, conscious mental states. Since experi-
ential  imaginings  re-create  experiential  mental
states, they can be classified according to the
underlying  taxonomy  of  the  conscious  mental
states that they re-create. Dokic and Arcangeli
argue that there are two types of Experiential
Imagination: objective imagination and subject-
ive  imagination.  Objective  imagination  re-cre-
ates experiences about the external world, while
subjective  imagination  re-creates  experiences
about mental or bodily states of oneself.  Fur-
thermore, the authors refine the category of the
objective imagination by dividing it into sensory
imagination  and  cognitive  imagination.  This
taxonomy of the Experiential Imagination sug-
gested by Dokic and Arcangeli provides a struc-
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ture within which to understand the vast spec-
trum of mental states classified as experiential
imaginings by referring to the notions of sub-
jective and objective imagination. The authors
additionally  suggest  an  attractive  perspective
on cognitive imaginings, which relies on the idea
that these have a phenomenal character as well.
I  would  like  to  discuss  three  aspects  of
Dokic and Arcangeli’s paper and close with my
own reflections on the topic. I will start with a
point concerning the definition of Experiential
Imagination as re-creating other mental states
(section 2). Two points about the taxonomy it-
self will follow this discussion: the second point
deals with the notions of objective and subject-
ive imagination (section  3). A third point with
which I will be concerned is the classification of
cognitive imaginings within the suggested tax-
onomy (section 4). It is unclear whether and in
what sense the notion of  re-creation is helpful
for delineating the suggested taxonomy of Ex-
periential Imagination. The taxonomy faces cer-
tain issues that are partly grounded in the no-
tion of re-creation.
Given these considerations, I will present
my own take on a classification of imaginings
that does not involve the notion of re-creation
and  is  based  on  our  pre-theoretical  opinions
about imaginings. In addition to this, I explore
the notion of an empty perspective to describe a
phenomenological difference in the perspectival
character of imaginings and non-imaginative ex-
periences (see section 5).
2 Re-creating experiences in imagination
I would like to focus first on the notion of Ex-
periential Imagination itself. Dokic and Arcan-
geli want to develop a taxonomy of Experiential
Imagination, and they therefore start by explor-
ing the mental states that fall under this cat-
egory.  The  authors  introduce  the  subject  of
their  taxonomy,  the  Experiential  Imagination,
as  follows (see  Dokic &  Arcangeli this collec-
tion, p. 2): Experiential Imagination is first of
all imagination that is experience-like. Whether
all instances of imaginings are of this kind or
whether there may be kinds of imagination that
do  not  fall  under  this  category  is  left  open
(Dokic &  Arcangeli this collection, p. 2). The
notion of Experiential Imagination is spelled out
further  by referring to Christopher Peacocke’s
so-called General Hypothesis (GH):
To imagine something is always at least to
imagine,  from the  inside,  being  in  some
conscious state (see Peacocke 1985, p. 21).
According to this definition, Experiential Ima-
gination is imagining something  from the in-
side,  which is  defined as involving “the per-
spective of a conscious experience” (Dokic &
Arcangeli this collection,  p.  3).  An  example
would  be  visually  imagining  a  white  sandy
beach,  which  involves  a  certain  experiential
perspective (Dokic & Arcangeli this collection,
p. 3). The authors call this kind of imagina-
tion  “X-like”  imagination  or  “re-creating  X”
in imagination (Dokic & Arcangeli this collec-
tion, p. 3), with X standing for the non-ima-
ginative mental state that is re-created (Dokic
&  Arcangeli this collection,  p.  3).  Following
this  terminology,  visually  imagining  a  white
sandy beach is  vision-like imagination or  re-
creating a visual experience of a white sandy
beach in the imagination. The authors sum up
these  considerations  in  a  brief  discussion  on
the notion of re-creation: Experiential Imagin-
ation is, according to the authors, imagination
that  re-creates  non-imaginative  conscious
states  (Dokic &  Arcangeli this collection,  p.
3). The idea that imaginative states re-create
other mental states allows  Dokic &  Arcangeli
to ground their taxonomy of the Experiential
Imagination on a classification of such re-cre-
ated mental states. A taxonomy of these un-
derlying  non-imaginative  mental  states  can
therefore serve as a basis  for a taxonomy of
the corresponding imaginative states (this col-
lection,  p.  3).  Dokic  and  Arcangeli  do  not
commit  themselves  to  any  existing  account
that explains the imagination in terms of  re-
creation or simulation (Dokic & Arcangeli this
collection,  p. 3).  The notion of  re-creating a
non-imaginative mental  state is  not explored
further, since “it is enough for our purposes to
accept  the  idea  that  a  phenomenologically
useful taxonomy of imagination can be guided
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by a corresponding taxonomy of non-imaginat-
ive  mental  states”  (Dokic &  Arcangeli this
collection, p. 3).
Even  if  the  authors  wish  to  remain  as
neutral as possible with respect to the notion of
re-creation, it is important to spell it out. There
are two main reasons why I think that this no-
tion should be explored further: first, the notion
of re-creation is crucial to the nature and scope
of the taxonomy in which it is involved. Second,
it  seems  to  me  that  the  authors  oscillate  to
some extent between different notions of re-cre-
ation,  rather  than  actually  remaining  neutral
about it. 
Concerning the first point, there seem at
least three options available for understanding
the idea that imaginings re-create other mental
states, assuming that re-creating is not used to
specify sub-personal processes but deals instead
with mental states on a personal level:
(1) As a mere way of speaking to refer to
x-like imaginings
(2) As the claim that imaginings re-create
an experiential mode
(3) As the claim that imaginings re-create
experiences as part of their contents
The first way to understand the notion of re-
creating is to use it synonymously with the no-
tion of x-like imagination. What I mean by this
is that we may use the notion of re-creating X
in imagination to refer to having an imagining
with an x-like phenomenology. In which case, for
example, re-creating a visual experience in ima-
gination would be synonymous with  having a
vision-like phenomenology. Understood like this,
the notion of re-creating is simply used to refer
to  imaginings  with  an  experience-like  phe-
nomenology. This is merely a way of speaking
or a terminological stipulation. If the notion is
used like this, it does not assume or specify any
relation between imagination and experience in
general (or between particular  imaginings and
experiences). That is, using the notion in this
way does not commit us to the claim that ima-
ginings are related to or dependent on experi-
ences in any sense. However, if the notion of re-
creation is used as a mere way of speaking, it
would be better to omit it from the taxonomy
altogether, since it does not play any explanat-
ory role or add any technical term. Instead, we
could  simply  speak  of  x-like imagination  and
thereby refer to imaginings that have an x-like
phenomenology. 
The other two ways of spelling out the no-
tion  of  re-creating  are  more  substantial  than
just  synonyms  for  x-like  imaginings:  in  these
versions,  the  notion  of  re-creation  is  a  meta-
physical notion that is used to indicate a rela-
tion between imaginings and experiences. Used
like  this,  the  notion  of  re-creation  involves  a
claim about the metaphysical structure of ima-
ginings (or the imagination),  since it endorses
the idea that imaginings are related to experi-
ences in a specific way. The nature of this rela-
tion can be spelled out differently. Version (2)
claims that imaginings re-create experiences in
the following sense: for every type of experience
there is a respective imaginative mode. There is
a visual mode of imagination, an auditory mode
of imagination, a proprioceptive mode of ima-
gination, and so forth. In this sense, every type
of experience is re-created by a specific type of
Experiential  Imagination.  Version  (3)  claims
something  else,  namely  that  different  experi-
ences are re-created as part of the contents of
imaginings:  if  I  visually imagine an object O,
for  example,  the imagining has as  part  of  its
content a visual experience of O.
These two notions of re-creation yield dif-
ferent  taxonomies  with  different  metaphysical
underpinnings: a taxonomy based on (2) differ-
entiates  imaginings  according  to  their  mode,
while a taxonomy based on (3) classifies imagin-
ings according to their contents. If re-creation is
understood  as  specified  in  (2),  such  that  for
every  experience-type  there  is  an  imaginative
type that re-creates this experience-type, this is
a  different  metaphysical  claim  to  the  one
sketched in (3). As such, one could claim that
there is one type of imagination that re-creates
various experience-types by taking them up as
parts of their contents. The nature of the rela-
tion  called  re-creation therefore  has  con-
sequences for what is taxonomised: this can be,
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for example, the mode or the content of an ima-
gining. Neglecting this notion (if it is considered
to be a substantial metaphysical notion) there-
fore means neglecting the metaphysical basis of
the taxonomy. Thus, it seems to me that from a
methodological  point  of  view it  is  indeed im-
portant to clarify which notion of re-creation is
in play.
The second worry I  want to raise about
the notion of re-creation is that the authors do
not in fact remain neutral with regard to this
notion. First, it seems that the notion of re-cre-
ating that the authors have in mind is not only
a synonym for the expression x-like imaginings.
One reason to think so is that Dokic and Arcan-
geli  use  the  notion  of  re-creation  in  crucial
definitions  such as,  for  example,  to  formulate
the various versions of the General Hypothesis.
One example is as follows:
SensH: To imagine something sensorily is
always at least to re-create some sensory
experience. (Dokic & Arcangeli this collec-
tion, p. 4)
If  to re-create some sensory experience is syn-
onymous with having an imagining with a sens-
ory phenomenology, the hypothesis and its vari-
ants are no longer interesting claims. This indic-
ates that the notion is more than what I called
a mere way of speaking, but instead refers to
(and thereby stipulates) a relation between ima-
ginings and experiences or imagination and ex-
perience in general.
Additionally, it seems to me that the sug-
gested taxonomy oscillates between different no-
tions  of  re-creation.  On  the  one  hand,  Dokic
and  Arcangeli  sometimes  seem  to  sympathise
with the mode-sense of the notion of re-creation
(as  in  (2)).  When  introducing  the  distinction
between  objective  and  subjective  imagination,
they claim, for example, that this distinction is
concerned with the mode of the experience and
not with the content (Dokic &  Arcangeli this
collection, p. 9). I address this point in more de-
tail  in  section  3,  below.  On  the  other  hand,
Dokic and Arcangeli employ the General Hypo-
thesis and develop various variants of it. As a
reminder,  the  General  Hypothesis  claims  that
“to imagine something is always at least to ima-
gine, from the inside, being in some conscious
state” (Peacocke 1985, p. 21). This thesis is put
forward by  Christopher Peacocke (1985, p. 21)
and Michael Martin (2002), who call it the “De-
pendency Thesis” (Martin 2002). It  is  usually
considered to be a claim about what an imagin-
ing represents  (see e.g.,  Dorsch 2012,  pp.  294
and pp. 314; see also Paul Noordhof’s explora-
tion  and  criticism  of  the  thesis  in  Noordhof
2002). The idea behind these claims is that ima-
ginings are experiential in nature because what
we  imagine  in  the  imagining  are  experiences:
“sensory imagining  is  experiential  or  phenom-
enal precisely because what is imagined is ex-
periential  or phenomenal” (Martin 2002: 406).
This means that my visual imagining of an ob-
ject O represents an experience of O and there-
fore  is  experiential.  The  General  Hypothesis
hence seems to imply, at least implicitly, a spe-
cific  conception of  re-creation:  it  endorses  the
idea that imaginings involve experiences as part
of their contents, which is the notion of re-cre-
ation I formulated in version (3). Therefore, this
view is not neutral about the nature of re-creat-
ing:  relying on the General  Hypothesis brings
with it a certain commitment about the notion
of re-creation involved (given that one adopts
the suggested reading of the General Hypothesis
and its variants).
In this section, I (1.) discussed three inter-
pretations of the notion of re-creation that I take
to be the most relevant in the given context, since
they are alluded to by the authors. It seems that
the notion of re-creation needs to be fleshed out
further if it is to play some explanatory role in
the  taxonomy (otherwise  it  can  be  dismissed);
and (2.) argued that the background assumptions
of the taxonomy are committed to differing inter-
pretations of the notion of re-creation. Therefore,
the authors do not remain neutral about the no-
tion of re-creation that is involved here but seem
to implicitly adopt different notions of re-creation.
One way of solving these issues would be to ad-
dress them and commit to a specific notion of re-
creation. Another solution would be to eliminate
the  notion  of  re-creation  from  the  taxonomy,
which is what I will suggest in the final section of
this commentary.
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3 Subjective and objective imagination 
and the self
One central aspect of the taxonomy that Dokic
& Arcangeli propose is the distinction between
subjective  imagination  and  objective  imagina-
tion (see this collection, pp. 4). Subjective ima-
gination re-creates internal experiences: experi-
ences that are “supposed to be about a mental
or bodily state of oneself” (Dokic &  Arcangeli
this collection, p. 6).  As an example, the au-
thors point to “proprioceptive and agentive ex-
periences” (Dokic & Arcangeli this collection, p.
6) such as imagining the movements of swim-
ming in the sea. In contrast, objective imagina-
tion re-creates external experiences.  These are
experiences  that  are  “typically  about  the  ex-
ternal  world”  (Dokic &  Arcangeli this collec-
tion, p. 6)—such as, for example, visual experi-
ences of objects.  Dokic & Arcangeli claim that
experiential  imaginings  in  general  can  be  di-
vided into subjective and objective imaginings
(this collection, p. 6). In a second step, this dif-
ferentiation  is  then  distinguished  from  Zeno
Vendler’s  distinction  between  imaginings  that
either  implicitly  or  explicitly  involve  the  self
(Dokic & Arcangeli this collection, pp. 7). The
authors argue that Vendler’s categorisation dif-
fers from their own by providing four examples
of cases of subjective and objective imagination
that involve the self either implicitly or expli-
citly (Dokic & Arcangeli this collection, p. 8).
I have a number of worries about some of
the ideas and notions that the authors put for-
ward along this line of thought. My first worry
concerns the claim that the suggested differenti-
ation  of  objective  and  subjective  imagination
concerns the  mode of the respective state and
therefore  differs  from  Vendler’s  distinction,
which is thought to be about the state’s content
(Dokic &  Arcangeli this collection,  p.  8).  In-
ternal and external experiences are equally  in-
ternal in some sense, since they are experiences
that are internal  to some subject. As I under-
stand the authors here, the difference between
internal  and external  experiences is  that they
are usually about internal or external entities,
respectively. Thus, in the given context, the no-
tions  internal and  external apparently  specify
what the experiences are about. On the level of
imagination,  subjective and objective imagina-
tion re-creates  these different types of  experi-
ences. The authors specify this idea by spelling
out two versions of the General Hypothesis ad-
apted for objective and subjective imagination,
called ObjH and SubjH (Dokic & Arcangeli this
collection, p. 6). As I specified above in section
2, one can read the General Hypothesis and its
variants  as  claiming that  imaginings  re-create
experiences in the sense that they represent ex-
periences as part of  their  contents.  If  one ac-
cepts this interpretation, it is not obvious to me
why and how re-creating internal and external
experiences in the imagination yields imaginings
that  are  different  in  mode (namely  subjective
and objective imaginings) and not in terms of
what they represent. This point is an exempli-
fication of the issue I raised in section 2: it de-
pends on how one spells out the notion of re-
creation  whether  or  not  the line  of  argument
that the authors present to distinguish their no-
tions from Vendler’s is convincing.
My second worry concerns the notion of
implicitly involving the self. It seems to me that
there is room to argue that both objective and
subjective imagination as defined by Dokic and
Arcangeli always involve the self implicitly (the
authors  briefly  address  this  point  in  footnote
13). If this were the case it is unclear how their
notions are different from Vendler’s. The self is
implicitly involved in an imagining if  “it fixes
the point of view internal to the imagined scene
without  being  a  constituent  of  that  scene”
(Dokic & Arcangeli this collection, p. 7). An ex-
ample is imagining seeing the Pantheon: there is
a specific point of view involved in this imagin-
ing  (Dokic &  Arcangeli this collection,  p.  7).
This, however, seems to be the definition of Ex-
periential  Imagination  in general that the au-
thors  propose  in  the  beginning  of  the  paper.
They  explain  (by  referring  to  Peacocke)  that
Experiential Imagination always involves an ex-
periential  perspective (Dokic &  Arcangeli this
collection, p. 3). If involving an experiential per-
spective  is  sufficient  to  implicitly  involve  the
self, and if experiential imaginings are defined
as imaginings that involve an experiential per-
spective,  then every experiential  imagining in-
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volves the self implicitly. If this is indeed how
the  authors  conceive  of  Experiential  Imagina-
tion,  a  notion  introduced  by  Michael  Martin
may be helpful for dismissing certain difficulties
(though I am aware that he uses this notion in
a  context  with  different  argumentative  aims).
Martin argues (similarly to Peacocke)  that  at
least some sensory imaginings involve a point of
view,  and  thereby  implicitly  represent  experi-
ences (2002, pp. 40). However, as he explains,
the presence of a point of view in the imagining
does not imply that I myself occupy this point
of  view:  “[t]he  point  of  view within the  ima-
gined scene is  notoriously empty enough that
one can in occupying that point of view imagine
being someone other that one actually is” (Mar-
tin 2002, p. 411). I take this to be a promising
way of differentiating imaginings from non-ima-
ginative experiences, since they involve different
kinds  of  points  of  view or  perspectivalness  (I
will say more on this in section 5).
Maybe this  notion of  an  empty point  of
view can also be helpful for further sharpening
the notions of objective and subjective imagina-
tion. One could argue that objective experien-
tial imaginings involve a point of view—but an
empty  one.  Thus,  imagining  seeing  the  Pan-
theon involves a point of view, but this point of
view is empty in the sense that it must not be
myself  occupying  this  point  of  view.  In  this
sense, objective imaginings may not involve the
self at all. This observation could also serve to
set  the  subjective/objective  distinction  apart
from Vendler’s. But it is probably more difficult
to transfer the notion of an empty point of view
to  subjective  imagination,  given  that  it  is
defined as re-creating experiences about oneself.
Maybe this is close to what the authors have in
mind when they loosen the notion of subjective
imagination towards  the  end of  the  paper  by
claiming  that  subjective  imaginings  may  be
neutral about the identity of the self involved
(Dokic & Arcangeli this collection, p. 16). Thus,
to conclude, considering the notion of an empty
point of view at least seems to be an interesting
option to be explored in order to strengthen the
objective/subjective distinction and the notion
of subjective imagination. Apart from this sug-
gestion, I will come back to the notion of an
empty point of view in the final section of this
commentary  and  on  this  basis  offer  an  addi-
tional perspective.
4 The phenomenal character of cognitive 
imaginings
My third and final point concerns the classifica-
tion of cognitive imaginings. Cognitive imagin-
ings are usually considered to be non-sensory in
the sense of not having a sensory phenomenal
character or indeed any phenomenal character
at all. An example of cognitive imagination is to
imagine that there is a largest prime number.
Dokic and Arcangeli suggest that this orthodox
classification may be misguided, since one can
plausibly argue that cognitive imaginings have a
certain phenomenology, namely a cognitive one
(this collection, pp. 10–11). Therefore, the au-
thors claim, we could classify them as experien-
tial imaginings as well.
I think the idea of ascribing a certain cog-
nitive phenomenology to cognitive imaginings is
very attractive, since it acknowledges the idea of
a  cognitive  phenomenology in  general  and al-
lows us to classify all kinds of imaginings ac-
cording to one single feature, which is their phe-
nomenal character (see also section 5). However,
I am unsure about the classification of cognitive
imaginings  as  experiential  imaginings.  Here  is
why: in the beginning of the paper, the authors
define  one  important  feature  of  the  kinds  of
imaginings that they consider experiential: they
involve an “experiential perspective” and are (in
this sense) “from the inside” (see  Dokic & Ar-
cangeli this collection,  p. 3).  It  is  not spelled
out in detail how we should understand the no-
tion of an experiential perspective but, as I in-
terpret it, this involves at least that things are
oriented  “within  egocentric  space”  (Martin
2002, p. 408), to use Martin’s expression. Mar-
tin only speaks about visual perceptual experi-
ences, but it seems to me that one can plausibly
expand this notion to all kinds of experiences:
they involve an egocentric perspective. As I un-
derstand  Dokic  and  Arcangeli,  they  consider
this egocentric perspective to be a defining fea-
ture of the phenomenology of experiential ima-
ginings that re-create experiences.
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If  cognitive  imaginings  are considered  to
be  experiential  imaginings,  and if  experiential
imaginings  are  considered  to  involve  an  ego-
centric perspective, one would expect cognitive
imaginings to also have this egocentric perspect-
ive. However, it seems to me that the phenom-
enal character of cognitive imaginings does not
involve  the  perspective  of  an  experience.  If  I
imagine that the earth is flat (and according to
the authors thereby re-create the belief that the
earth is flat) it seems that imagining this does
not  involve  any  egocentric  perspective  in  the
sense given above. If at all, cognitive imaginings
incorporate a very specific kind of perspective
that is distinct from any experiential  perspect-
ive. Consequently, even if cognitive imaginings
have a phenomenal character, this seems quite
different from the phenomenal character of ex-
periences (given that the latter is considered to
involve an experiential perspective). If the au-
thors endorse a different notion of experiential
phenomenal character and  having an experien-
tial phenomenal character is, for example, just a
synonym  for  having  a  phenomenal  character,
then my point is not valid. However, if Dokic
and Arcangeli indeed think that having an ex-
periential phenomenal character means that an
egocentric perspective is involved (as in the case
of experiences), I suggest that we need to recon-
sider the classification of cognitive imaginings as
provided here. While I find the idea that cognit-
ive imaginings may have some kind of phenom-
enal character convincing, it seems less convin-
cing to me that they have an experiential phe-
nomenal character in the sense discussed here.
Therefore,  I  propose  that  we  instead  classify
cognitive imaginings as a different kind of ima-
gination  with  a  specific  cognitive  phenomenal
character.
5 Conclusion
The issues I raised in the previous sections can
probably all  be met in order to maintain the
taxonomy  suggested  by  Dokic  and  Arcangeli
and to develop it further. Nevertheless, I think
that the points I raised also allow for an altern-
ative interpretation that offers a different per-
spective on a taxonomy of  imaginings.  Before
summarising the results of this commentary, I
would like to explore this alternative perspect-
ive on the topic. My two main claims are: (1.)
that it is not helpful to involve the notion of re-
creation in a taxonomy of imaginings, and that
the taxonomy can be  yielded without it;  and
(2.) that the specific way the self is (not) in-
volved  in  imaginings  distinguishes them  from
experiences rather than mirroring experiences.
Concerning the first point, it is neither ne-
cessary nor helpful to involve the notion of re-
creation or any other metaphysical notion if the
aim is to yield a phenomenological taxonomy of
imaginative states (and I take this to be one of
the aims of Dokic and Arcangeli’s paper). In or-
der to yield such a phenomenological taxonomy,
we can simply rely on our pre-theoretical classi-
fications of imaginings as vision-like or action-
like, and so forth. The notion vision-like and its
cognates x-like can be understood as phenomen-
ological notions here: to the imagining subject,
what it is like to visually imagine an object is
similar to what it is like to visually experience
an object.  That  there  are  such  similarities  in
phenomenal character is an interesting observa-
tion that allows us to build a phenomenological
taxonomy. If one additionally accepts the idea
of a cognitive phenomenology, this account al-
lows us to capture cognitive imaginings as well,
and to classify them according to their (cognit-
ive) phenomenal character. Explaining why ima-
ginings are vision-like or action-like, and what
the  metaphysical  underpinnings  of  this  phe-
nomenological  taxonomy  may  be  is  another
task. These tasks should not be entangled.
One may worry that these pre-theoretical
notions  (such as  vision-like)  and opinions  are
too imprecise and not apt to yield a taxonomy
of  imaginative  states  that  can ground further
philosophical  theorising.  One  answer  to  this
worry is to expand a line of thought suggested
by Fabian Dorsch. He considers the fact that we
stably,  effortlessly,  and consistently “do group
together a large variety of mental occurrences in
the class of  imaginings,  while excluding many
others” (Dorsch 2012, p. 6) to justify the idea
that imaginings form a unified class of mental
states. This line of thought can be adapted to
ground a more fine-grained taxonomy of  ima-
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ginings,  based on our pre-theoretical opinions:
we also stably, effortlessly, and consistently clas-
sify various imaginings as vision-like, audition-
like, movement-like, and so forth. There are cer-
tainly borderline cases or instances of imagin-
ings that combine several phenomenological as-
pects, but nevertheless this pre-theoretical clas-
sification  is  stable  in  the  way  described  by
Dorsch.  I  consider  therefore this  intuitive and
pre-theoretical classification a helpful taxonomy
of  imaginings  that  can  serve  as  a  sufficiently
justified  starting point for further philosophical
reflection.  This  pre-theoretical  classification  of
imaginings  that  I  suggest  probably  does  not
yield essentially different categories to the tax-
onomy  suggested  by  Dokic  and  Arcangeli.  It
classifies imaginings according to their phenom-
enal character as vision-like, action-like, and so
forth, which are all categories acknowledged by
the authors. What I wish to claim is that in or-
der to ground this taxonomy, it is not necessary
or helpful to involve a metaphysical notion such
as  re-creation.  It  is  sufficient  to recur  to our
pre-theoretical  classification  of  imaginative
states.
The only category that is probably not re-
flected  in  this  phenomenological  taxonomy  is
the distinction between subjective and objective
imagination,  which,  according  to  the  authors,
also “gives rise to phenomenologically different
imaginings” (Dokic & Arcangeli this collection,
p. 6). The reason for this is that there is a dif-
ference  between  the  more  fine-grained  phe-
nomenology and the more coarse-grained phe-
nomenology of a mental state. By this I mean
that  we  can  distinguish  various  aspects  of  a
mental state’s phenomenal character.  Two dif-
ferent visual experiences of a red apple and a
green  apple  respectively  share  the  coarse-
grained phenomenal  character  of  being visual,
but  they  differ  in  terms  of  their  fine-grained
phenomenal character: perceiving a red apple is
phenomenally different from perceiving a green
apple.  The taxonomy I  suggest  above  is  con-
cerned with the rather coarse-grained phenom-
enal character of imaginings that allows us to
classify them as vision-like, action-like, and so
forth. An even more coarse-grained phenomenal
character would be the one which all types of
imaginings have in contrast to cognitive state,
for example. The distinction between objective
and  subjective  imagination  seems  to  reflect
more  fine-grained  phenomenological  categories
than those that classify imaginings according to
what  their  phenomenal  character  resembles.  I
am not sure whether there is a phenomenology
of objectiveness (as opposed to subjectiveness)
that,  for  example,  unifies  sensory imagination
and  cognitive  imagination  as  opposed  to
proprioceptive  imagination  (as  suggested  by
Dokic and Arcangeli). This shows that the ac-
count  and  methodology  that  I  propose  also
faces certain challenges. One challenge would be
to single out exactly which aspects of the phe-
nomenology we take to be defining marks for a
categorisation. Another challenge, for example,
would be to point out that for this account we
have  to  rely  on  introspective  findings,  whose
epistemic status and reliability may be contro-
versial. Nevertheless I think that pre-theoretical
reflection based on phenomenological findings is
an appropriate way to lay out a taxonomy of
the  mental  states  we  classify  as  imaginings,
since in principle it can be done stably, effort-
lessly, and consistently (see again Dorsch 2012,
p. 6). 
The second aspect I would like to address
is the distinction between subjective and object-
ive  imagination.  These  notions  introduced  by
Dokic and Arcangeli are very helpful, since they
reveal the particular ways in which the self (or
aspects  of  the  self)  is  involved  in  imaginings.
However, I think one can draw different conclu-
sions from these observations than those presen-
ted by the authors. As I suggested in section 3,
I  think the best way to describe the point of
view involved in imaginings is by adopting and
expanding the notion of an empty point of view.
It seems to me that imaginings do not involve
the self in the same way as, for example, experi-
ences do. I will explore this line of thought by
pointing to the example of visual experiences as
opposed to visual imaginings. The perspectival
character of a visual experience has several as-
pects: it involves a distinct point of view that
locates the perceiving subject in a determinate
relation to its surrounding objects. Objects are
therefore perceived as being close, far away, to
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the left,  above, and so forth (see also  Martin
2002, p. 408). In this sense the self is involved,
since there is always an egocentric perspective.
However,  in  imagination  this  kind  of  per-
spectivalness need not be fully realised. It seems
possible to imagine an object without imagining
it at a certain distance or at a certain position.
If I perceive a tree, I perceive it far away to the
left,  for  example.  If  I  imagine  a  tree  I  can
simply imagine the tree. I can imagine a tree in
the distance to the left but this is something I
deliberately add to the imagining. This thought
can be expanded to other forms of imaginings
as well. One way to capture this particular per-
spectival character of imaginings is to adopt the
proposed  notion  of  an  empty  point  of  view:
while experiences involve the self in the sense of
involving an egocentric perspective (which is a
non-empty point of view), imaginings involve an
empty point of view. This does not mean that
one adopts, in imagining, the point of view of
someone else (as opposed to the point of view of
myself), but that this point of view is  empty.
One important difference between this notion of
an empty point of view and Dokic and Arcan-
geli’s account is that it differentiates imaginings
from experiences:  regarding the point  of  view
that is  involved, imaginings differ importantly
from non-imaginative experiential  states,  since
the former may involve an empty point of view.
In contrast to this, Dokic and Arcangeli seem to
think  that  imaginings  mirror  non-imaginative
states with respect to the nature of the point of
view involved (again probably partly due to the
notion of re-creation). Again, the approach that
I suggest certainly faces challenges.  One chal-
lenge is to demand that we spell out the notion
of an empty point of view in more detail. So far,
I have only pointed in the direction of how to
capture  certain  particular  features  of  imagin-
ings. However, investigating this difference fur-
ther seems like a promising way to clarify the
nature of imaginings. 
To sum up, I will briefly repeat the points
I discussed in this commentary: 
1. I suggested that we explore the notion of re-
creation further,  since it  occupies  a central
place in the suggested taxonomy of Experien-
tial  Imagination.  As  I  argued,  this  notion
must either be spelled out or omitted from
the taxonomy, since as an underdetermined
notion  it  does  not  add  to  the  explanatory
basis.  Furthermore,  I  showed  that  the  au-
thors seem to implicitly rely on different no-
tions  of  re-creation  instead  of  remaining
neutral about it.
2. I pointed to some worries about the distinc-
tion between subjective and objective imagin-
ation. I suggested that we adopt the notion
of an empty point of view to characterise the
kind of self-involvement we find in experien-
tial imaginings. 
3. I formulated my doubts about the classifica-
tion  of  cognitive  imaginings  as  experiential
imaginings due to their phenomenal charac-
ter, which does not seem to be experiential in
the sense that it does not involve an experi-
ential perspective.
I concluded these considerations with my own
interpretation of  the findings.  As I  suggested,
we can develop a phenomenological taxonomy of
different types of imaginings by basing it on our
pre-theoretical  opinions  about  imaginings.  We
do not need to involve the notion of re-creation
(or other non-phenomenological notions) in or-
der to do this. Clarifying the metaphysical un-
derpinnings of this taxonomy is a different task.
Additionally,  I  interpreted  reflections  on  the
various ways the self is involved in imaginings
as yielding the conclusion that imaginings differ
from experiences  in  terms  of  how  the  self  is
(not)  involved,  rather  than  mirroring  experi-
ences,  in  this  respect.  Imaginings  involve  an
empty point of view, while experiences have an
egocentric point of view. I consider both these
aspects relevant for any theory of imaginings. 
Dokic and Arcangeli’s taxonomy has essen-
tially contributed to further developing a theory
of imaginings by revealing and illuminating rel-
evant aspects of the nature of imaginings. Their
observations have clearly uncovered a neuralgic
aspect of imaginings, which is how the self is in-
volved (or not involved) in imaginings. Further-
more, their taxonomy allows us to classify cog-
nitive imaginings in terms of their phenomenal
character and not, for example, with respect to
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what these are about. Although the taxonomy
reveals  how  heterogeneous  imaginings  are,  it
therefore  nevertheless  offers  a  unified  take  on
imaginings. Adopting Dokic and Arcangeli’s ob-
servations as a starting point for further invest-
igations will  certainly  be  very fruitful,  and is
sure to advance our understanding of the nature
of imaginings.
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